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Abstract:  Klein & Barron argue that insects are capable of subjective experience, i.e., sentience. 
Whereas we mostly agree with the conclusion of their arguments, we think there is an even 
more important message to be learned from their work. The line of reasoning opened by Klein & 
Barron proves instructive for how neuroscientists can and should explore the biological 
phenomenon of consciousness.  
  
Keywords:  Arthropoda, Bilateria, cephalisation, invertebrate neurobiology, LUCSA, Nephrozoa, 
sensory integration, Urbilateria, Xenacoelamorpha 
 
 
Eirik Søvik is an associate professor at 
Volda University College. He studies the 
function of biogenic amine systems in 





Clint J. Perry, Marie Curie postdoctoral 
fellow, Queen Mary University of 
London, uses integrative neurobiology 
to explore the cognitive capacities of 
insects and the underlying mechanisms 









1. Scientific Approaches to Consciousness 
 
Consciousness, once thought to be supernatural and unique to humans, is now known, 
undoubtedly, to be the product of animal evolution. This means that consciousness, even as 
experienced by humans, is the result of gradual modification of pre-existing traits. The only 
possible conclusion from this is that the animals around us possess various forms of 
consciousness that primarily differ from ours by degree. Unless we resort to supernatural 
explanations, this is indisputable. 
 
It is, however, very contentious to what degree different animals are conscious, i.e., how they 
experience their world. The only animal for which we can say anything with certainty is humans 
(but see “the problem of other minds,” Hyslop, 2016). This has led to extensive arguments 
about the machinery, biological or otherwise, required for consciousness. This discussion has 
primarily been limited to mammals (Seth, Baars, and Edelman, 2005) and other vertebrates 
(Cabanac, Cabanac, and Parent, 2009; Feinberg and Mallatt, 2013). The consequence of this 
restriction has been that most researchers have assumed invertebrates to be void of 
consciousness, something akin to how we imagine a thermostat experiencing regulating 
temperature. 
 
2. Consciousness in Invertebrate Animals 
 
In the philosophy of consciousness, sentience is the ability to feel (anything at all) subjectively. 
Klein & Barron (K & B) refer to this as subjective experience (Barron & Klein, 2016; Klein & 
Barron, 2016) and have rejected the notion of “simple” invertebrates, setting forth the claim 
that insects are capable of sentience. Although this claim may seem radical, K & B’s assessment 
is relatively straightforward and makes intuitive sense, from both a biological and an 
evolutionary perspective. More important, in our view, their papers clearly attempt to define 
the requirement for sentience: a rudimentary sense of space. K & B do not mean just the ability 
to move through the environment and respond to external stimuli (e.g., a robot tracking a light 
source), but rather centralised integration of motor output and sensory input. This allows an 
organism to keep track of how it moves through space and how space (and the elements within 
that space) moves around it. K & B argue that having this somato-spatial capacity is 
necessary/sufficient for sentience. Here we avoid delving deeper into this claim and instead 
attempt to see where such a naturalistic hypothesis of sentience can take us. 
  
3. The Evolution of Consciousness and LUCSA 
 
This simple claim leads to a few predictions about sentience that make it possible to start the 
arduous work of tracing its evolutionary origins and history. A centralised nervous system (CNS) 
capable of integrating sensory information and motor output is required. Sentience can 
therefore not have emerged prior to nervous system cephalisation, and sentience cannot exist 
outside of Bilateria (Fig. 1A), as this is the only place we find CNS. The pattern of cephalisation 
observed in Xenacoelomorpha (Gavilan et al., 2015) makes it unlikely that Urbilateria, the 
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ancestor of all bilateral animals, was sentient (Fig. 1B). Within Nephrazoa we find cephalisation 







We are thus left with two interesting scenarios: sentience predates the division of proto- and 
deuterostomes, or it evolved independently multiple times. K & B briefly mention the former 
scenario, drawing on a recent article by Strausfeld and Hirth (2013), who argue that 
morphological and transcriptomic similarities between arthropod and vertebrate core control 
systems result from a common ancient origin. This is indeed a very tantalising hypothesis; it 
means that the ancestor of all nephrozoan animals was sentient. This ancestor, the Last 
Universal Common Sentient Ancestor (LUCSA), must, at a minimum, have had a nervous system 
with a higher brain centre, perhaps similar to the insect central complex. To determine whether 
the LUCSA hypothesis is correct, many hurdles still need to be cleared. There are rival 
explanations of why higher brain regions in disparate animals appear similar; we, like others 
(e.g., Farris, 2015), believe that the current evidence points more strongly towards homoplasy 
than conservation.  
 
The LUCSA hypothesis suggests some interesting conjectures, for example, that sentience 
originated only once and has been lost numerous times. K & B mention how nematodes lack the 
machinery for sentience, but LUCSA suggests that this was not because their lifestyle never 
necessitated it, but because it was lost. Nematodes are just one example among many, as most 












Figure 1. (A) The only place in nature we find animals with 
centralised nervous systems is within Bilateria. Phylogeny 
based on Dunn, Giribet, Edgecombe, and Hejnol (2014). (B) It 
is unlikely that centralised nervous systems evolved before 
Xaenocoelomorpha and Nephrozoa split because 
Xenoturbellia have only epidermal nerve nets. It is also 
unlikely that sentience evolved independently within Acoela 
because their nervous system appears incapable of the kind of 
integration hypothesized. Phylogeny based on Cannon et al. 
(2016). 







Of course, we do not yet know what kind of neural machinery is required for the kind of 
integration envisioned by K & B. Nor do we have a functional characterisation of the existing 
circuitry within most of these phyla. To move forward with this question it might be instructive 
to investigate what has occurred at the family, genus, and species levels. For example, among 
the insects we have many examples of species that have gone through extreme miniaturization, 
discarding the majority of their brain (sometimes even dispensing with the nucleus of their 
neurons, Polilov, 2012). By studying the neural circuitry of these insects, it might be possible to 
determine whether they retained the same functional integration despite severely reduced 
neural tissue. A basic wiring-plan across all of Nephrozoa comprising a very limited number of 
neurons that allow for sentience would make LUCSA a lot more plausible. 
 
4. The Future of Consciousness Research 
 
This may all sound like idle speculation at this point, and we completely agree, but it opens an 
important door. We are certain that if we want to understand consciousness, we must take a 
scientific approach and resolve the evolutionary history of this trait. We thus have two very 
important tasks ahead of us: (1) we must try to come to terms empirically with what kinds of 
“cognitive machinery” are necessary to support sentience, and (2) we must investigate widely 
across animal phyla, including amongst the invertebrates, to determine where they are present. 
 
On a final note, if the K & B predictions should be wrong, and, say, temporal integration is what 
matters (Engel and Singer, 2001), it will of course change specific statements above, but the 











Figure 2. With the exception of 
Echinodermata, all animal phyla 
within Nephrozoa have centralised 
nervous systems. However, only a 
few groups have the dense 
neuropils that may be required for 
the integration of sensory input and 
motor output that gives animals a 
sense of space. Phylogeny after 
Dunn et al. (2014). 
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